



# OECD INTERIM ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

*Warning: low growth ahead*

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ECOSCOPE blog: [oecdoscope.wordpress.com](http://oecdoscope.wordpress.com)



## Key messages

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The global economic outlook continues to darken

Trade and political tensions fuel risks of persistent low growth

Governments can reverse the spiralling costs of uncertainty and invest more




# Global growth is weakening

## G20 Advanced

GDP projections, %, year-on-year


● November 2018 ● May 2019 ● September 2019



## G20 Emerging

GDP projections, %, year-on-year

● November 2018 ● May 2019 ● September 2019



Note: G20 advanced economies are Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, the United Kingdom and the United States. G20 emerging economies are Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and Turkey. Source: OECD Economic Outlook database; and OECD calculations.



# GDP growth projections downgraded

## OECD Interim Economic Outlook projections

%, year-on-year. Arrows indicate the direction of revisions since May 2019.

▼ downward by 0.6 pp and more    
 ▼ downward by 0.3 to 0.6 pp    
 ▼ downward by less than 0.3 pp    
 ▸ no revision    
 ▲ upward

	2018	2019	2020		2018	2019	2020
<b>World</b>	3.6	2.9 <span style="color: orange;">▼</span>	3.0 <span style="color: orange;">▼</span>	<b>G20</b>	3.8	3.1 <span style="color: orange;">▼</span>	3.2 <span style="color: orange;">▼</span>
<b>Australia</b>	2.7	1.7 <span style="color: red;">▼</span>	2.0 <span style="color: orange;">▼</span>	<b>Argentina</b>	-2.5	-2.7 <span style="color: red;">▼</span>	-1.8 <span style="color: red;">▼</span>
<b>Canada</b>	1.9	1.5 <span style="color: green;">▲</span>	1.6 <span style="color: orange;">▼</span>	<b>Brazil</b>	1.1	0.8 <span style="color: red;">▼</span>	1.7 <span style="color: red;">▼</span>
<b>Euro area</b>	1.9	1.1 <span style="color: orange;">▼</span>	1.0 <span style="color: orange;">▼</span>	<b>China</b>	6.6	6.1 <span style="color: orange;">▼</span>	5.7 <span style="color: orange;">▼</span>
<b>Germany</b>	1.5	0.5 <span style="color: orange;">▼</span>	0.6 <span style="color: orange;">▼</span>	<b>India<sup>1</sup></b>	6.8	5.9 <span style="color: red;">▼</span>	6.3 <span style="color: red;">▼</span>
<b>France</b>	1.7	1.3 <span style="color: grey;">▸</span>	1.2 <span style="color: orange;">▼</span>	<b>Indonesia</b>	5.2	5.0 <span style="color: orange;">▼</span>	5.0 <span style="color: orange;">▼</span>
<b>Italy</b>	0.7	0.0 <span style="color: grey;">▸</span>	0.4 <span style="color: orange;">▼</span>	<b>Mexico</b>	2.0	0.5 <span style="color: red;">▼</span>	1.5 <span style="color: orange;">▼</span>
<b>Japan</b>	0.8	1.0 <span style="color: green;">▲</span>	0.6 <span style="color: grey;">▸</span>	<b>Russia</b>	2.3	0.9 <span style="color: orange;">▼</span>	1.6 <span style="color: orange;">▼</span>
<b>Korea</b>	2.7	2.1 <span style="color: orange;">▼</span>	2.3 <span style="color: orange;">▼</span>	<b>Saudi Arabia</b>	2.2	1.5 <span style="color: red;">▼</span>	1.5 <span style="color: orange;">▼</span>
<b>United Kingdom</b>	1.4	1.0 <span style="color: orange;">▼</span>	0.9 <span style="color: orange;">▼</span>	<b>South Africa</b>	0.8	0.5 <span style="color: red;">▼</span>	1.1 <span style="color: red;">▼</span>
<b>United States</b>	2.9	2.4 <span style="color: orange;">▼</span>	2.0 <span style="color: orange;">▼</span>	<b>Turkey</b>	2.8	-0.3 <span style="color: green;">▲</span>	1.6 <span style="color: grey;">▸</span>

Note: Difference in percentage points based on rounded figures. The European Union is a full member of the G20, but the G20 aggregate only includes countries that are also members in their own right.

1. Fiscal years starting in April.


Source: OECD Economic Outlook database; and OECD calculations.



# Trade growth is stalling as restrictions bite


## New trade restrictions in the G20

Trade coverage of measures introduced in each period



## World trade growth

Goods and services, volumes




Note: Left: These figures are estimates and represent the trade coverage of the measures (i.e. annual imports of the products concerned in economies affected by the measures) introduced since the last date and not the cumulative impact of the trade measures.

Source: OECD Economic Outlook database; OECD-UNCTAD-WTO report on G20 trade and investment measures; and OECD calculations.




# Uncertainty is dragging down manufacturing and investment

## Industrial production



## Investment growth

G20 fixed investment




Note: Left: Industrial production aggregation uses PPP weights. Right: China and Saudi Arabia not included due to unavailability of quarterly data.

Source: OECD Economic Outlook database; US Federal Reserve; Eurostat; Ministry and Trade and Industry, Japan; KOSIS; and OECD calculations.




# Job creation is slowing

## Employment growth



## Hiring intentions



Note: Left: 2019H1 is annualised. Right: PMI for employment in manufacturing and services.  
Source: OECD Economic Outlook database; Markit; and OECD calculations.



# TRADE AND POLITICAL TENSIONS FUEL RISKS OF PERSISTENT LOW GROWTH






# Trade conflicts are entrenching uncertainty and risk long-lasting harm to investment


## Impact of 2019 US-China trade restrictions

*Difference from baseline after 2 to 3 years*

### Business investment



### GDP




Note: Total investment for China. The scenario shows the impact of: the United States raising tariffs on USD 200 billion of imports from China from 10% to 25% from mid-May 2019 (with reciprocal action by China on USD 60 billion of imports from the United States); the US further raising tariffs to 30% on USD 200 billion of imports to China in October and implementing tariffs of 15% on USD 110 billion and USD 160 billion of remaining imports from China in September and December 2019 respectively, with China assumed to react proportionately to these changes by raising tariffs on imports from the United States; and a global rise of 50 basis points in investment risk premia that persists for three years before slowly fading thereafter. All tariff shocks are maintained for six years. Based on simulations on NiGEM in forward-looking mode.  
Source: OECD calculations.



# A no-deal Brexit would have large costs


## UK GDP

%, difference from baseline



## Euro area GDP

%, difference from baseline




Note: The direct effects include a decline in UK export volumes, declines in EU countries' exports with the impact on individual countries dependent on the extent of their direct trade with the UK, a depreciation of the sterling upon exit, a decline in labour-augmenting technical progress due to lower trade openness and a decline in net inward migration. The uncertainty effect captures a rise in investment risk premia. No monetary and fiscal policy response is assumed beyond already announced measures, which are incorporated in the baseline. Source: OECD calculations, using the NiGEM global macroeconomic model.




# A no-deal Brexit would lead to sectoral disruptions in European economies

## Impact of a no-deal on production by sector, medium to long term *% difference from baseline*

UK



EU27







# Investors hold massive amounts of risky debt

## Investment-grade corporate bonds

*% share of bond issuance, by rating*



## Corporate leveraged loans outstanding



Note: Left: Only non-financial companies rated by S&P, Fitch and/or Moody's. Right: The outstanding amount is calculated based on non-financial corporate loan issuance but excludes the value of drawn and undrawn revolving credit facilities. A linear amortisation schedule is assumed for term loans and other amortising loans (i.e., mortgages, equipment, construction, commercial loans). All other term loans are not amortised as they are repayable at maturity. To account for loan re-financing, a 40% early repayment ratio is assumed.  
Source: Patalano and Roulet (2019); and Çelik and Isaksson (2019).



# The long-term decline in trend growth could persist

## OECD economies



Note: Solid lines are linear projections. Trend GDP growth is the growth rate of potential output.  
Source: OECD Economic Outlook database.




**GOVERNMENTS CAN  
REVERSE THE SPIRALING  
COSTS OF UNCERTAINTY  
AND INVEST MORE**




# Monetary policy: little room for manoeuvre in advanced economies

## Yield curves on government bonds


### United States



### Euro area



### Japan




Note: Yield curves on benchmark government bonds as of 16 September 2019.  
Source: Refinitiv; and ECB.



# Fiscal and structural policies should accompany central bank efforts in the Euro area


## Real GDP, euro area

*% , difference from baseline*



## Asset prices after five years

*% , difference from baseline*




Note: The QE scenario is calibrated to the measures introduced by the ECB in 2015. The scenario with public investment and structural reforms includes a rise in public investment by  $\frac{3}{4}$  percent of GDP for five years, productivity-enhancing structural reforms that rise total factor productivity growth by 0.2 percentage points each year for five years, and a fifty percent smaller QE programme.  
Source: OECD calculations, using the NiGEM global macroeconomic model.





# Restoring business confidence would revive investment




Note: The last data point is August 2019. Both series are global.  
Source: policyuncertainty.org; Markit; and OECD calculations.



# Meeting infrastructure investment needs would help escape the risk of persistent low growth

## Infrastructure investment needs

*Global annual average spending needs by 2030*



Note: The scenario does not include the additional investments needed to meet carbon emissions targets.

Source: OECD Technical note on estimates of infrastructure investment needs, 2017.



# Key messages

## The global outlook continues to darken

- Growth continues to slow in advanced and emerging economies
- Investment is taking a hit as high policy uncertainty feeds a collapse in trade growth and a manufacturing slump
- Consumption is holding up but is threatened by slowing job growth

## Trade and political tensions fuel risks of persistent low growth

- Escalating trade restrictions are entrenching uncertainty, endangering future growth
- A no-deal Brexit would hurt an already weak UK economy and create disruptions across Europe
- High private debt of deteriorating quality could amplify the effects of shocks

## Governments can reverse the spiraling costs of uncertainty and invest more

- Halt the surge in trade-distorting tariffs and subsidies and restore predictable rules for business
- Limit the reliance on overstretched monetary policy, think fiscal and structural
- Escape the trap of persistent weak growth: undertake public investment